We examine implicit equity transaction costs incurred on United States exchanges by domestic institutional investors compared to foreign domiciled money managers. The average equally weighted disadvantage of foreign investors for purchases (sales) is 3.6 (5.1) basis points on a daily interval, and 19.1 (20.5) basis points weekly. The disadvantage persists across different stock types and exchanges. Foreign investors pay three cents per share less than local institutions in brokerage commissions, an insufficient edge to offset their disadvantage in implicit costs. Relating explicit costs to realized prices, we show that local investors benefit more from their brokerage commissions than foreigners. 
Introduction
The costs of executing security trades are significant in the assessment of an investment's performance. Comparing the transaction costs incurred by one group of investors to another is an issue of perennial interest to academics, investors and policy makers. Hence, there is now a large and growing literature investigating whether foreign investors incur greater equity trade execution costs than domestic traders. For example, Hau (2001) , and Dvořák (2005) examine foreign investor's comparative transaction-level trading performance. Both studies concur with Choe, Kho, and Stulz's (2005) findings, based on Korean data, that local investors have an informational advantage over foreign traders. This explanation relies on models such as Brennan, Cao, Strong, and Xu (2005) , in which domestic investors are more knowledgeable about the returns on local investments than foreign investors.
In this article, we provide additional evidence on the issue through an empirical comparison of the implicit and explicit equity execution costs incurred by foreign institutional investors with execution costs for comparable domestic trades in U.S. stock markets. Using a proprietary institutional trading data set provided by Abel/Noser Corporation, U.S., that discloses the home country of the initiator of a trade, we analyze market impact and direct transaction costs. We match foreign investors' trades by stock with their domestic equivalents and then estimate differences in implicit and explicit costs between the two samples.
Apart from being the first empirical analysis of the comparative performance of foreign investors' equity trades in the U.S., this study offers two important additions to the existing literature. First, our empirical approach allows results to be confirmed on different trading exchanges (NYSE and Nasdaq). We also report on the validity of our findings across the main types of equity securities common stocks and American Depository Receipts (ADRs). These two attributes of the study confirm that the disadvantage experienced by foreign investors in papers such as Bonser-Neal, Linnan, and Neal (1999) , Choe, Kho and Stulz (2005, hereafter CKS) , Dvořák (2005) and Richards (2005) are not due simply to idiosyncratic, country-level factors affecting foreign investors in emerging markets. There are significant differences in trading mechanisms and risk characteristics affecting transactions executed across U.S. exchanges and stock types, which suggest finding stable results in line with the previous literature offers an important out-of-sample contribution to the literature.
A second advantage offered by this paper is that we investigate differences in explicit transaction costs incurred by foreign investors compared to local money managers. This issue, to the best of our knowledge, has not been examined before, a surprising gap in the existing literature as commissions and fees can reasonably be expected to contain information about the agency relationship between brokers and their clients. Portfolio managers are concerned with whether there is a tradeoff between brokerage commissions and the quality of trade execution as reflected in the execution price (Block, French and McInish (1994) ). The end of fixed brokerage commissions on May 1, 1975 led to lower negotiated commissions which have since been further reduced by technological improvements and increased competition from nontraditional service providers such as discount brokerages. However, these developments have not diminished the importance of commissions in the relationship between investors and stockbrokers. Traders must know how well their brokers work on their behalf for a given direct trading cost to decide which brokers should receive their orders in the future (Harris (2003) ). Similarly brokers can use commissions to discriminate between clients in quality of service offered. For instance, Reuter (2006) finds a strong positive correlation between past commissions paid by fund managers and the initial public offerings allocated to them by lead underwriters. Citing anecdotal market practice Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2006) , observe that discrimination among clients is a common feature of the brokerage industry. Some customers are given disproportionately better service on the basis of their long term relationship with the broker. Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2006) , suggest per share commissions are in effect a fixed fee which, when paid, entitles a client to premium services, not a marginal cost of trade execution as generally assumed in the literature (see, for example, [Bertsimas and Lo (1993) ] and [Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2001) ]). Block, French, and McInish (1994) allow for a variable component in commissions that is used to pay for particularly difficult trades.
By investing from a distance and mostly through more than one (home market) stockbroker, we expect foreign investors to have different agency arrangements with U.S. brokerage houses than domestic traders. This difference could manifest itself in the quality of brokerage service delivered to the two investor types. According to recent theories, explicit trading costs incorporate a fixed component designed to purchase superior brokerage services such as research and identifying sources of liquidity. A smaller variable component can be expected to correlate with more complexity in the trading environment. We examine whether the nature of international money managers' relations with U.S. based brokers affects the explicit trading costs they are charged. We also compare the sensitivity of brokerage commissions paid by foreign and domestic investors, respectively, to their realized stock prices.
Our results are summarized as follows. On implicit trading costs, we find that foreign investors experience an average daily equally weighted disadvantage of 3.6 basis points (bps) for stock purchases and 5.1 bps for sales. To illustrate the economic significance of this evidence, a foreign institutional investor incurring a round trip cost of 8.7 bps needs to trade just 12 times in a year to reduce annual returns by one percentage point. This drag on performance is non-trivial given that foreign investors earn an average 3.5% per annum from U.S. financial assets (Gourinchas and Rey (2006) ). The results generally hold after we partition our sample according to trade sizes, stock types and trading exchanges. For example, after we remove tax haven countries from the sample of investors' countries of origin, the buy (sell) disadvantage is 5.4 (6.2) bps. For common stock trades executed on NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges only, foreign investors face a 6.7 (6.7) bps price differential relative to locals. For ADR trades the differential decreases to 4.7 (5.8) bps for buys and sells, respectively. The full impact of our headline daily foreigner disadvantage estimate is more apparent when one considers investors' repeated trades over long periods. Translated to weekly measures, the equally weighted buy (sell) disadvantage to foreign investors is 19.1 (20.5) bps. Our findings show that even in the U.S., a well established and highly competitive market, the "burden of foreignness" affects international investors' realized prices.
We ask whether there is any evidence that foreign traders shun those U.S. stockbrokers who deliver poor trading performance. Controlling for broker identity and therefore limiting the analysis to trades where domestic and foreign investors use the same brokers, we find that the disadvantage persists for stock purchases but not for sales.
This finding suggests that a potential economic explanation for at least part of the difference in trading performance between foreigners and locals can be attributed to external money managers' relationship with her U.S. based broker.
We examine whether relations between brokers and investors, symbolized by explicit transaction costs, affect implicit transaction cost outcomes differently between foreigners and locals. Foreign investors pay six cents per share less in total explicit costs than local money managers. This difference is split equally between brokerage commissions and trading fees, although fees are subject to wider, trade specific variations. Relating brokerage commissions to implicit transaction costs, the evidence suggests domestic investors' trades have a greater sensitivity to the quality of service provided by brokers. For example, we find that if domestic investors increase the fixed component of their brokerage commissions by one percent, they reduce the market impact of stock purchases by 0.19%. In comparison, foreign investors' commissions have a negligible bearing on their implicit costs. The transaction cost savings due to foreign investors paying lower explicit costs are insufficient to make up for their disadvantage in implicit costs, and seem to deny foreign institutions the critical ability to negotiate difficult trades through their brokers.
While unique in its focus on explaining the role played by broker client relations in the burden faced by foreign investors, this paper naturally contributes to the literature contrasting the performance of foreign and domestic investors' portfolio flows. Some studies find superior performance by domestic investors (e.g. [Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) ] and [Dvořák (2005) ]) while others show contrary findings (e.g., [Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) ] and [Seasholes (2000) ]). Of particular interest to this study, Dvořák (2005) , examines the special case of Indonesia's separately licensed local and global brokerages and finds clients of the former earn higher short term stock returns while those of the latter are better long term performers. Brennan, Cao, Strong, and Xu (2005) , employ a noisy rational expectations model, extending Admati's (1985) multi-asset model, to analyze the determinants of the proportion of investors in country m with bullish and bearish views regarding the equity market of country k. Brennan, Cao, Strong, and Xu (2005) , find that foreign investors are more bullish (bearish) about a country as the returns of that country increase (decline), while domestic investors are not. Foreign investors are therefore more attuned to new public information. Our findings call for an extension of empirical assessments of foreign investors' return performance to the U.S. and for the inclusion of brokerage arrangements in studies comparing foreign and domestic investors. Finally, this paper has implications for our understanding of the home bias in investors' portfolios (see, for example, [French and Poterba (1991) ] and [Tesar and Werner (1995) ]) and the pace of the globalization of investment flows. Investors' transaction costs incurred abroad and their relations with brokers are important additions to the home bias phenomenon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we describe the transactions data, the sample selection process, and institutional details underpinning this study. The third section quantifies the extent of foreign trader disadvantage in implicit costs. We investigate differences in explicit costs and relate commissions to implicit costs in the fourth section. The last section summarizes and concludes.
Data and Institutional Arrangements
The trade-level data we use in this paper are from Abel/Noser Corporation, an agency only brokerage firm located in New York. The data consist of U.S. equity trades initiated by institutional traders based in over 65 countries for the period 1 July 1999 to 30 September 2004. This data set has been intermittently released to academic researchers over the past two decades and has spawned studies starting with Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988) . The data include the transactions of institutional brokers who subscribe to Abel/Noser's trade execution analysis services. It is worth noting that the investors represented in our sample are likely to be better informed about trading costs than the average trader. The trading costs we measure using this database could therefore understate the average trading costs of all institutional investors, as Blume (1993) noted.
Each observation in the database includes information relating to: (1) date and time stamps for the order at various points, including decision, entry, placement and execution (2) the stock symbol, (3) the number of shares, (4) an Abel/Noser identifier of the brokerage firm that executed the trade, (5) and the broker's commission and fee charges. The critical attribute of the data set from the perspective of our study is that it contains identifiers for the country of origin of each trade initiator. This characteristic has not been used in the literature to date. Another unique quality of the database is that the trade direction is explicitly given, removing the need to devise a separate method of distinguishing buy from sell transactions.
We identify all instances when local investors initiate trades in the same securities as foreigners. We begin with trades recorded on the same day, then, separately, over the Monday to Friday week window when financial markets are open, excluding holidays.
We now have daily and weekly samples for the two classes of trades, domestic and foreign initiated, that form the basis of our analysis. We describe the samples in Table 1. For ease of data handling, we restrict our sample of investors' country of origin to those with no less than 100 trades and where each stock is traded at least five times over our sample period. Several common stocks and ADRs moved from one exchange to another during the sample period. We account for these changes to avoid double counting. We also exclude two NYSE listed closed-end funds and a Nasdaq share of beneficial interest (SBI) stock. Our procedure identifies 426 stocks that are traded by both locals and foreigners based in 52 countries. There are 3,869,765 trades in the matched set. Of these trades domestic (U.S.) investors initiate 3,335,162 and foreigners 534,603 trades, about 16 percent of the sample. The exchange foreign investors use most is NYSE. The average stock price per trade is approximately $32.00 based on all sample trades. Foreigners and domestic institutions tend to purchase and sell similarly priced stocks, regardless of trading exchange.
[ Table 1 around here] A potential concern about the representativeness of our equity trades data need to be addressed. How similar are Able/Noser's client trades to those of other international investors? We compare Abel/Noser flows with monthly cross border aggregates of U.S. bound equity portfolio flows from the U.S. Treasury International Capital System (TIC).
We find that the aggregate inflows and outflows are highly correlated at the monthly level with Abel/Noser flows. The correlation coefficients for this comparison are 0.63 and 0.61 for buys and sells, respectively, showing our data substantially capture the actual patterns of U.S. bound institutional money flows. These high correlations occur despite the fact that the TIC data include trading activity not in the Abel/Noser data, such as, individual investor transactions and trades in unlisted stocks.
We enrich the transactions database using information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Specifically, we obtain individual stock characteristics requiring time series data, including, shares outstanding, number of trades per stock (for Nasdaq stocks), volume, opening and closing prices, spreads, and stock exchange codes.
For data quality assurance we carried out a number of standard cross checks for variables contained in our base data set with other sources. For example, when matching stocks with other databases, we used ticker codes together with codes provided by Abel/Noser, and also cross referenced them with CUSIP identifiers. The two-letter country codes in the Abel/Noser data set were cross-referenced to United Nations data for validation. As a result, we excluded the few ambiguously referenced or coded country identifiers we find, including single letter or other symbol codes in obtaining our final sample of 52 countries.
Understanding the institutional arrangements pertaining to investing abroad is critical for interpreting the findings of this study. A foreign money manager intending to invest in U.S. stocks typically appoints a full service brokerage in their home market that maintains relationships with banks and brokers in the U.S. Banks enter the process to facilitate currency transactions, effect international financial transfers, and arrange for the custody of securities in the U.S. The U.S. brokers facilitate the actual equity trades.
Commission costs are therefore likely to be higher than the trader's routine local trades, since two brokerages are involved, and currency exchange fees and local taxes charged.
On selling securities the reverse of these steps is followed until capital is repatriated to the foreign institution.
Differences between Foreign and Domestic Investors' Implicit Transaction Costs
In this section we examine differences between the costs incurred by foreign investors and those reported for the matched daily sample of domestic trades. We close this section by examining the robustness of our findings (1) across our sample period, (2) holding broker identities constant, and (3) specifying alternative trade size cutoffs.
Approach
Since any advantage or otherwise faced by foreign investors can persist beyond the CKS (2005) daily perspective, as Dvořák, (2005) 
In the specification, is the price of stock i on day d for trade t. is the number of shares of the trade for stock i on day d for trade t. 
Finally, we compute the price ratio, for all purchases (and sales) by institutional investors of type j for stock i on a given day d. A price ratio of more than one for buys for a particular institutional investor implies that this investor has a buy trade above the mean price on that day. We now have a measure in percentage terms which is stated in basis points in tables where the column is headed "D-F x 100" (i.e., Domestic minus Foreign times 100). The main advantage of using price ratios in comparing the price performance of different investor types is that the method does not rely on deviations from model driven expected price estimates that require arbitrary assumptions on the price formation process. In later tests, we use implementation shortfall measures of implicit transaction costs that rely on independent or "unperturbed" benchmarks and are increasingly popular with practitioners and financial economists. The implementation shortfall approach allows us to check on the robustness of our VWAP based metrics.
Following CKS (2005) we split our sample by trade sizes to take into account that prices could be determined differently for large versus small trades, for example. We therefore apply the execution performance measures described above on the full sample, and separately on samples representing large (over $150,000), medium (between $20,000
1 From the trade data we cannot determine if foreign institutional investors are trading U.S. stocks from inside the U.S. or whether subsidiaries of U.S. based institutional investors are trading U.S. stocks from outside the U.S. However, if such investors exist in our database, we treat them as foreigners and locals, respectively, and their effect would likely be to reduce the magnitude of our disadvantage measure. We thank Hui Zheng for raising this point. and $150,000) and small (below $20,000) trades.
2 In line with CKS (2005), our arbitrary break points in the three size samples are in dollar value as opposed to shares, which enables us to control for the wide variation in stock prices across the U.S. exchanges for common stocks and ADRs.
To provide new evidence on the relative performance of investors conditioned on whether they are local or not, we measure differences in prices across various trading exchanges NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex. We also consider each of the main stock types, common stocks, and ADRs separately.
Results
We begin by summarizing the results of univariate tests of differences in implicit transaction costs between the foreign and domestic samples in [ Table 2 around here]
The results in Table 2 When we remove tax haven countries from the sample of investors' countries of origin, the buy (sell) disadvantage is even higher at 5.4 (6.2) bps.
The rest of the results in Table 2 generally attest to the robustness of the measures of the disadvantage experienced by foreign traders. The differences in prices realized persist regardless of type of security, trade size and stock exchange. Based on the extent of their disadvantage relative to locals, foreign institutional investors are worse off when trading common stocks and ADRs on NYSE than on Nasdaq.
The evidence on the foreigner disadvantage in trading ADRs requires further scrutiny. It is reasonable to expect that when foreign investors are trading in ADRs from their own home market they have better "firm specific" information relative to domestic U.S. investors. Concentrating on ADRs could be a powerful test of whether information asymmetry is the main contributor to the foreigner disadvantage. To pursue this conjecture, we isolate all those foreign-originated trades that involve ADRs outside the investor's home market. However, we find that these trades constitute only 3.4% (2.4%) of buys (sells) in our sample. Removing them from our ADR based tests of differences in trade prices does not alter our findings of a foreigner disadvantage. It appears from these findings that even in a context where information asymmetry is not a major distinguishing factor between domestic and foreign institutional investors the latter still remain at a trading disadvantage.
Looking at the foreign disadvantage from the perspective of trade direction yields an interesting trend. It appears that the extent to which foreign investors "overpay" on buying stocks is less than how much they are "undercut" on selling stocks. Could it be that this finding is a result of foreign investors being more impatient when selling or choosing to sell when markets are illiquid? CKS (2005) test for this possibility and do not find evidence supporting the conjecture.
[ Table 3 around here]
The trade weighted price ratios and differences across stocks over the 1,320-day study period are summarized in Table 3 . Our headline trade weighted buy (sell) result of 2.3 (3.5) bps is similar to our equally weighted buy (sell) result of 3.6 (5.1) bps. This finding differs from CKS (2005) [ Table 4 around here]
We present the price difference estimates based on FOC data in Table 4. The table shows results for the full sample of trades originating from FOC countries, and those executed on NYSE and Nasdaq common stocks. There are too few FOC specific ADR trades on either NYSE or Nasdaq to enable meaningful statistical analysis. The results in the column labeled "D-F x 100" of Table 4 show that the burden of being foreign is considerably lower in magnitude, though statistically significant, in a number of buy samples. However, many of the coefficients have opposite signs to those reflected in Table 2 . A likely cause of these mixed findings is the ambiguity of U.S. bound investment flows described above. Hence, in further tests we exclude FOC countries. We also exclude Amex based trades because of restrictions of the data noted above.
The results from our weekly analysis confirm our findings of foreign disadvantage with even more significance in economic terms than the daily results (see Table A1 in the Appendix A, for a selection of results based on equally weighted price ratios). For example, at the total sample level, the foreign disadvantage for buys (sells) is 19.1 (20.5)
bps. Comparing the weekly disadvantage with our findings from a daily analysis highlights the foreign trader long-term disadvantage is not just intra-day (Dvořák (2005) ).
The results reflect the disadvantage accumulated over time. The weekly results show that the foreigner disadvantage is larger for worked trades. One implication of the findings is that, wherever possible, foreign traders should not work orders for longer than a day. To be conservative in our analysis, and for brevity, we base the remainder of our price ratio tests on daily observations. In summary, foreigners clearly suffer from a "burden of foreignness" in economically and statistically significant terms in most instances. Daily differences are narrower than weekly differences, suggesting that difficulty in trade (inability of foreigners to fill trades in a short time) is an important issue requiring further analysis.
Our univariate analysis of differences in average prices paid between foreign and domestic traders strongly suggests that splitting trades by country of origin has a significant bearing on execution quality, specifically price impact. We still need to demonstrate that country-specific variables explain the differences after controlling for trade characteristics. We take up this task for our core NYSE and Nasdaq sample in the remainder of the paper.
Robustness and Further Tests
In this section we address several outstanding questions relating to our main findings. Are the results stable across time? We split the sample period into three subsamples of 440 trade-days each and repeat our price ratio analysis. We report the results in Panels A-C of Table B1 in Appendix B. The patterns of foreign investor disadvantage we report above generally hold. Only in the third sub-period is the disadvantage experienced on buys not statistically significant. Generally, though, it is apparent in the results that the disadvantage in latter stages of our sample period is significantly lower than at the height of the technology bubble (1999) (2000) and subsequent to its bursting (around 2001). Our results also cover times of significant institutional changes in the U.S.
markets. Our second sub-sample period of 440 trade-days, for example, broadly coincides with decimalization on NYSE and Nasdaq markets in early 2001.
3
We also target another significant date in our sample period, September 11, 2001.
It is possible that investors' perceptions of the U.S. stock markets, and potentially, our results, were affected by the major disruptions to financial markets caused by the attacks on the U.S. and more specifically New York, the world's most influential financial center for equities. We therefore split our analysis between the periods prior to and post We repeat our comparative analysis of price ratios on this sub-sample. We find that the foreign investor disadvantage persists for buys, even though, at 2.6 bps, the difference is somewhat lower in magnitude than our headline results. The disadvantage reverses in the case of sells, with foreigners selling at prices that are 9.7 bps better than domestic money managers when using the same brokers. It appears that, at least in the case of sells, part of the reason why foreign investors attain inferior prices lies in their choice of broker. On the other hand, the persistence of the disadvantage in the case of buys conforms to the market power argument.
Finally, we compare our results with those derived from alternative trade size cutoffs. Instead of the trade value sample partitioning procedure outlined above, we separate the total sample by alternative trade value cutoffs and by trade volume. The trade value cutoffs are less than US$32,000; US$32,000-320,000; and above US$320,000. These trade values are derived as the average price of US$32 (see Table 1 ) multiplied by volumes of 1,000 and 10,000 stocks per trade. The trade volume cutoffs are 1,000 stocks;
1,000 to 9,999 stocks; and 10,000 or more stocks per trade. Trades over 10,000 shares constitute about 17% of trades in our sample and proxy for block trades. The trade size cutoff of 1,000 versus 5,000 because trade sizes in the US have been decreasing over time 5 We thank Avner Kalay for suggesting this explanation.
(in our sample trades less than 1,000 represented about 45% of total trades). We find that the results (available from the authors upon request) between the three sub samples are qualitatively similar to our earlier findings.
Differences between Foreign and Domestic Investors' Explicit Transaction Costs
We now turn to examining the differences in explicit costs between domestic and foreign investors. Each of these investor groups has a unique relationship with U.S. based brokerages. This setting provides an apt laboratory to examine the link between agency arrangements, effected through commissions and fees, and trade execution quality.
Magnitude of Differences in Explicit Transaction Costs
Our first objective in this section is to show differences in the level of explicit transaction costs paid by our two investor groups. Our findings so far suggest that if the hypothesis developed by Block, French, and McInish (1994) that brokerage commission is inversely related to indirect transaction costs is correct, then foreign investors must pay lower commissions. That foreign investors pay two sets of explicit transaction costs (to their home-market and international brokers) would suggest a strong incentive for them to negotiate lower commissions and fees with their U.S. brokers. In addition, if "premium services" (Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2006) ), for example receiving the first call when brokers discover new price sensitive information, are not within ready reach of foreign investors, their commissions should be lower. The prediction of lower explicit costs for foreign investors is contradicted by findings of higher transaction costs for international institutional investment (see, for example, [Perold and Sirri (1994) ] and [Livingston and O'Neal (1996) ]). It would also be reasonable to expect that, faced with the burden of trading from a distance foreign investors would wish to pay more for the services offered by U.S. brokers.
[ Table 5 around here]
We present the results of difference in means tests for commissions and fees in Table 5 . We consider total explicit costs and then commissions and fees separately. Panel A of Table 5 shows that on average domestic investors pay six cents more per share than foreign investors in total explicit costs. This difference is split equally between commissions and fees. In Panel B we look at equity purchases alone. The difference is four cents per share in favor of foreign investors, and is slightly more in the case of commissions (three cents per share) than fees (two cents per share). When selling, the total explicit transaction cost advantage for foreign investors is even more pronounced, at eight cents per share. Domestic share market participants pay three cents more per share in commissions than foreign investors and five cents more per share in fees.
Undoubtedly, and as demonstrated below by the relevance of commissions to quality of execution, the explicit transaction costs we report here are economically significant.
However, equally significant is the fact that the saving on explicit costs, equivalent to approximately one basis point on an average share price of $32, is not sufficient to compensate foreign investors for the disadvantage they experience on implicit costs relative to local investors.
Note that we report the differences in commissions on a cents per share basis, which Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2006) suggest is the most appropriate representation of U.S. institutional commissions. The justification for using cents per share is that, unlike in Europe and Japan for example, variation in the distribution of U.S.
commissions is driven by price changes rather than commission level variations. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 5 seem to support the contention that commissions are fixed fees related to services provided by brokers to customers rather than a mechanism to pass on marginal costs of trading. The main determinant of the difference in total explicit costs levied foreigners and locals are fees per share. The standard deviation on fees shows a variability which far outstrips that in commissions. It appears from the magnitude of the variability that individually determined fees for specific services are responsible for the extremes in explicit cost levels. In further tests, we use commissions as our unit of analysis. We also truncate commissions above $0.30
per share, where less than 0.5 percent exists.
Do Explicit Transaction Costs Explain Differences in Execution Quality?
Our second objective in this section is to relate explicit transaction costs to execution quality, measured by implicit trading costs. Our approach to this analysis is similar in spirit to that of Block, French, and McInish (1994), and Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988) . We take into account previous theoretical and empirical patterns of relations between transaction costs and execution quality. Easley and O'Hara (1987) predict a positive relationship between execution costs and trade size as a result of adverse selection cost. Keim and Madhavan (1997; 1998), and Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2001) find a positive correlation between implicit and explicit costs. They suggest the correlation can be explained by the fact that the more difficult trades, which tend to have higher price impacts, are given to full service brokers, who charge higher Block, French, and McInish (1994) , to take into account the fact that at least a component of commissions is tied to trade characteristics.
As a first step towards understanding the nature of the explicit implicit cost tradeoffs, we need to test for relations between transaction costs and realized stock prices [ Table 6 around here]
To obtain a preliminary view of the relevance of transaction costs to realized prices we present the results of univariate regressions with dependent variables being our pre-trade and post-trade implicit costs as well as commissions in Table 6 . All the execution cost measures are highly significant in explaining execution prices when considered individually. We note, in particular, that commissions are positively related to prices and that the joint significance of the intercept and the price coefficient in the last regression shown in Table 6 suggest there is a (higher) fixed component and a (lower) variable component to the effect. However, we still require a more rigorous analysis of the relations between trading costs and execution prices in a multivariate regression setting. The analysis should distinguish buy from sell trades and assess the relevance of commissions paid by foreigners separately. We take up this task in Tables 7-9. [ Table 7 around here]
Our base model, reported in Table 7 , explains the proportion of implicit costs in transaction prices in terms of commissions and market conditions following Block, French, and McInish (1994) and Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988) . The results reported in Table 7 show that both the fixed and variable components of commissions explain implicit transaction costs at a high level of statistical significance in the presence of proxies for market conditions. For buy trades, the fixed portion of commissions has a negative coefficient, suggesting it is utilized to minimize the costs of purchasing stocks. The variable component carries a negative coefficient. That the coefficient on fixed commissions is much higher than that on variable commissions is consistent with the existence of a tradeoff between commissions and implicit transaction costs at very high stock prices. In line with Block, French, and McInish (1994) , the evidence suggests that considerations of the cost of executing trades become subordinate to the time and effort required to complete a transaction for complex buys with high implicit costs. For sells, the role of fixed and variable components reverses, as seen in the reversal of signs between coefficients on the two. We interpret this evidence to mean that as sells become harder to sustain above certain prices, the fixed component used to secure superior service under normal circumstances becomes insufficient to pay for considerations such as time and effort.
There is an asymmetry in the effects of commissions on buy and sell trades. Buys are associated with significantly larger coefficients than sells. For example, a coefficient on fixed commissions of -15.9628 suggests that an increase in the commission cost of one cent per share lowers the impact cost by 0.15%. However, the lower coefficients on sells suggest weaker links between commissions and implicit costs. This evidence is consistent with the view that investors' relations with brokers are complicated by brokers charging for non-execution related items such as research via soft dollar payments (Domowitz and Madhavan (2001)).
It is notable that in instances where it is statistically significant, trade difficulty increases implicit transaction costs. The coefficient on volatility is significant in the case of only one post-trade measure of implicit transaction costs but counterintuitive results.
On balance, it appears brokers are successful in managing most difficult trades although for some large trades there is some slippage of value due to difficulty of execution.
[ Table 8 around here]
In Table 8 we introduce a binary dummy variable indicating whether the trade is being executed on behalf of a foreign investor. This step allows us to test whether the results in Table 7 are not largely due to the presence of foreign investors in our sample who can be reasonably expected to be disadvantaged when negotiating with brokers based on the low commissions they pay. As a byproduct of this analysis, we are also interested in whether implementation shortfall measures confirm our earlier VWAP based estimates of the foreigner disadvantage. The critical test in this regard is whether the foreigner dummy variable has a positive sign. Our findings in Table 7 concerning fixed and variable commissions remain virtually unaffected by the inclusion of the foreign investor indicator. However, the variable seems to absorb some of the significance of the proxies for trade difficulty, consistent with the view that foreigners find it more difficult to negotiate complex trades through their U.S. based brokers. Barring one coefficient with an unexpected sign, the evidence in Table 8 confirms our findings of a foreigner disadvantage when executing trades in the U.S. Generally, there is a positive and highly statistically significant relationship between implicit transaction costs and the foreign investor indicator.
[ Table 9 around here] Table 9 reports the results of our modification of the baseline regression to include interaction terms composed of the foreigner dummy variable and commissions. If U.S. based brokers use commissions in more or less the same manner between local investors and foreigners, we would expect a distribution of coefficients in Table 9 similar to that in Table 7 . We find that the fixed component of commissions paid by foreigners is largely insignificant in explaining implicit transaction costs. However, the majority of pre-trade and post-trade measures of implicit transaction costs are associated with increasing variable commissions paid by foreigners. For both buys and sells, foreigners increase their commissions when faced with difficult trades.
[ Table 10 around here] Finally, Table 10 essentially restates the baseline findings, commissions paid by local investors have similar effects to those we report in Table 7 . In We show a significant difference in the explicit transaction costs paid by foreign investors than local institutions. This difference is split equally between commissions and fees. For buys, the difference is four cents per share in favor of foreign investors, and is slightly more in the case of commissions (three cents per share) than fees (two cents per share). When selling, the total explicit transaction cost advantage for foreign investors is even higher, at eight cents per share. Domestic share market participants pay three cents more per share in commissions than foreign investors and five cents more per share in fees. The difference in explicit costs is not sufficient to compensate foreign investors for the disadvantage they experience on implicit costs relative to local investors.
Finally, we trace the economic rationale of commissions to their link with market impact costs. Following suggestions that there are tradeoffs between the various components of transaction costs, we examine recent propositions by Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2006) , that a fixed component dominates commissions to pay for superior brokerage services. The evidence suggests that, through commissions, domestic investors can affect the quality of execution they receive from brokers, especially when buying stocks. Paying considerably less in explicit costs than domestic investors seems to deny international money managers the ability to negotiate difficult trades through their U.S. based brokers.
The main findings of this paper should interest financial economists and policy makers. First, the foreign investor disadvantage in transaction costs is not entirely an artifact of idiosyncratic factors such as the trading environment faced by foreign investors in emerging markets, the subject of most studies on this issue to date. Second, future research should consider investors' arrangements with their stockbrokers when examining transaction cost and portfolio performance outcomes for foreign investors.
Explicit transaction costs still have a meaningful bearing on securities trading. Finally, while addressing frictions affecting international financial, policy makers should take into account the nature of agency relations, not just market structures. Table A1 reports the prices incurred by domestic and foreign institutional investors trading stocks in the U.S. calculated using Eq. (1) Table B1 reports the prices incurred by domestic and foreign institutional investors trading stocks in the U.S. calculated using Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). The number of observations is shown in parentheses. Panels A-C are based on three equal sub-samples of 440 trade-days and panels D and E are pre and post September 11, 2001 respectively of the full 1,320 trade-day sample. The first four columns are the mean and standard deviations for domestic (D) and foreign (F), respectively. The difference between domestic and foreign investors' trade price ratios is given by D-F x100 where one percent corresponds to 100 basis points (bps). The t-value and p-value coefficients are based on difference in means tests. Table 2 Comparison of domestic and foreign investors' equally weighted daily price ratios Table 2 reports the prices incurred by domestic and foreign institutional investors trading stocks in the U.S. calculated using Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). The sample period is July 1999-September 2004. The number of observations is shown in parentheses. Panels B-I are based on sub-samples of the full sample used in Panel A. The first four columns are the mean and standard deviations for domestic (D) and foreign (F), respectively. The difference between domestic and foreign investors' trade price ratios is given by D-F x100 where one percent corresponds to 100 basis points (bps). Table 3 Comparison of domestic and foreign investors' trade weighted price ratios Table 3 reports the prices incurred by domestic and foreign institutional investors trading stocks in the U.S. calculated using Eq. (1) Table 4 Comparison of domestic and foreign investors' equal weighted price ratios: flag of convenience countries Table 4 reports the prices incurred by domestic and foreign institutional investors trading stocks in the U.S. calculated using Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). Panels B-C are based on sub-samples of the full sample used in Panel A. The first four columns are the mean and standard deviations for domestic (D) and foreign (F) investors, respectively. The difference between domestic and foreign investors' trade price ratios is given by D-F x100 where one percent corresponds to 100 basis points (bps). Table 5 Comparison of domestic and foreign investors' explicit transaction costs Table 6 Results of regressions of execution cost against trade execution price Table 8 Determinant of indirect transaction costs incorporating the foreigner identifier Table 8 reports the regression results of models explaining implicit transaction costs (ITC). The dependent variables, ITC d , ITC e , ITC p , ITC c and ITC m , are measures of implicit transaction costs or the difference between transaction costs and benchmarks based on decision, entry, placement, closing and the mean of the high and low price for the day, respectively. Commission Fixed denotes commission per share. Commission Variable is measured as commission per share times execution price times 100. Volatility is measured as daily high stock price minus daily low stock price divided by daily low stock price. Is given by trade quantity divided by trade-day share volume. t-statistics are in italics. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. Table 9 Determinants of implicit transaction costs incorporating foreigners' commissions Table 9 reports the regression results of models explaining implicit transaction costs (ITC). The dependent variables, ITC d , ITC e , ITC p , ITC c and ITC m , are measures of implicit transaction costs or the difference between transaction costs and benchmarks based on decision, entry, placement, closing and the mean of the high and low price for the day, respectively. Commission Fixed denotes commission per share. Commission Variable is measured as commission per share times execution price times 100. Volatility is measured as daily high stock price minus daily low stock price divided by daily low stock price. Is given by trade quantity divided by trade-day share volume. t-statistics are in italics. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. Table 10 Determinants of implicit transaction costs incorporating domestic investors' commissions Table 10 reports the regression results of models explaining implicit transaction costs (ITC). The dependent variables, ITC d , ITC e , ITC p , ITC c and ITC m , are measures of implicit transaction costs or the difference between transaction costs and benchmarks based on decision, entry, placement, closing and the mean of the high and low price for the day, respectively. Commission Fixed denotes commission per share. Commission Variable is measured as commission per share times execution price times 100. Volatility is measured as daily high stock price minus daily low stock price divided by daily low stock price. Is given by trade quantity divided by trade-day share volume. t-statistics are in italics. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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